Post by Moses on Apr 3, 2005 10:36:51 GMT -5
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16942-2005Mar31.html
USAF sucks:
In discussing the conduct of the war, the report notes that the opening salvo of airstrikes, dubbed "shock and awe" by some at the Pentagon, did not precipitate the collapse of the government that airpower advocates had hoped for.
"The attacks on 'regime' targets (leadership, command and control and infrastructure) were able to disrupt but not eliminate the ability of Iraqi leaders to communicate with the Iraqi people and military forces," the report says. "For the future, a caution is in order with respect to expectations of what air attacks on 'regime' targets can achieve."
Later helicopter attack missions against Iraqi forces "proved risky and not very productive," the report says, a reference to the troubles Apache units encountered dealing with ground fire from enemy fighters hidden in populated areas. "Though planned, no air assault operations were undertaken," the report notes, concluding that the experience "raises questions about some of the emerging concepts" for deep helicopter strikes in enemy territory.
Intelligence gathering, too, fell short. Airborne sensors were "in many cases unable to locate and identify" the swarms of Iraqi paramilitary fighters who moved along roads in civilian vehicles or hid out in built-up neighborhoods, the report says. When information about enemy locations did become available, it frequently failed to get far enough down the chain of command.
"Division commanders and above were well serviced, while tactical commanders often did not receive specific or actionable intelligence," the report says. "Tactical units were often moving too fast for the information to be useful, or the information was not detailed enough."
Bomb damage assessments "fell behind early" as a result of bad weather, a scarcity of sensor systems and inadequate reporting, the report notes. "Turn-around times were measured in days instead of hours." As a result, U.S. aircraft restruck some targets "unnecessarily," and ground forces had "scant knowledge of the condition of enemy forces along the route of advance."
Difficulties in collecting and disseminating intelligence from airborne sensors have persisted in more recent counterinsurgency operations, the report says. Until such links prove more effective, the report advises caution in proceeding with a costly Army program called Future Combat Systems, which envisions an array of new lightly armored fighting vehicles and robots that would rely heavily on networked systems of information.
Pentagon control sucks:
Planning for the invasion's aftermath rested with the Defense Department, the report recalls, rather than with the State Department or the National Security Council. "Overall, this approach worked poorly," the report says, noting that the Pentagon lacked the expertise, funding authority and contacts with civilian aid organizations for the job.
When the insurgency arose, the report says, U.S. authorities failed to understand how it differed from past "wars of national liberation" or from a "classical guerrilla-type campaign."
"Iraqi insurgents are groups of disparate opposition elements with no center of gravity, no clear leader, no aim to seize and hold territory, and no single defined or unifying ideology," the report says. "The Iraqi insurgency demonstrates the closest manifestation yet of 'net war,' which is characterized by flatter, more linear networks rather than the pyramidal hierarchies and command and control systems of traditional insurgent organizations."
In future counterinsurgency operations, the report concludes, the Pentagon should rely more on forces with specialized training in such warfare. [huh?-- fewer troops would have worked better?] Planning for postwar recovery, the report adds, must involve greater coordination between the Pentagon and other government agencies and greater attention by defense officials to securing the peace. The report recommends setting up "some process for exposing senior officials to possibilities other than those being assumed in their planning."
USAF sucks:
In discussing the conduct of the war, the report notes that the opening salvo of airstrikes, dubbed "shock and awe" by some at the Pentagon, did not precipitate the collapse of the government that airpower advocates had hoped for.
"The attacks on 'regime' targets (leadership, command and control and infrastructure) were able to disrupt but not eliminate the ability of Iraqi leaders to communicate with the Iraqi people and military forces," the report says. "For the future, a caution is in order with respect to expectations of what air attacks on 'regime' targets can achieve."
Later helicopter attack missions against Iraqi forces "proved risky and not very productive," the report says, a reference to the troubles Apache units encountered dealing with ground fire from enemy fighters hidden in populated areas. "Though planned, no air assault operations were undertaken," the report notes, concluding that the experience "raises questions about some of the emerging concepts" for deep helicopter strikes in enemy territory.
Intelligence gathering, too, fell short. Airborne sensors were "in many cases unable to locate and identify" the swarms of Iraqi paramilitary fighters who moved along roads in civilian vehicles or hid out in built-up neighborhoods, the report says. When information about enemy locations did become available, it frequently failed to get far enough down the chain of command.
"Division commanders and above were well serviced, while tactical commanders often did not receive specific or actionable intelligence," the report says. "Tactical units were often moving too fast for the information to be useful, or the information was not detailed enough."
Bomb damage assessments "fell behind early" as a result of bad weather, a scarcity of sensor systems and inadequate reporting, the report notes. "Turn-around times were measured in days instead of hours." As a result, U.S. aircraft restruck some targets "unnecessarily," and ground forces had "scant knowledge of the condition of enemy forces along the route of advance."
Difficulties in collecting and disseminating intelligence from airborne sensors have persisted in more recent counterinsurgency operations, the report says. Until such links prove more effective, the report advises caution in proceeding with a costly Army program called Future Combat Systems, which envisions an array of new lightly armored fighting vehicles and robots that would rely heavily on networked systems of information.
Pentagon control sucks:
Planning for the invasion's aftermath rested with the Defense Department, the report recalls, rather than with the State Department or the National Security Council. "Overall, this approach worked poorly," the report says, noting that the Pentagon lacked the expertise, funding authority and contacts with civilian aid organizations for the job.
When the insurgency arose, the report says, U.S. authorities failed to understand how it differed from past "wars of national liberation" or from a "classical guerrilla-type campaign."
"Iraqi insurgents are groups of disparate opposition elements with no center of gravity, no clear leader, no aim to seize and hold territory, and no single defined or unifying ideology," the report says. "The Iraqi insurgency demonstrates the closest manifestation yet of 'net war,' which is characterized by flatter, more linear networks rather than the pyramidal hierarchies and command and control systems of traditional insurgent organizations."
In future counterinsurgency operations, the report concludes, the Pentagon should rely more on forces with specialized training in such warfare. [huh?-- fewer troops would have worked better?] Planning for postwar recovery, the report adds, must involve greater coordination between the Pentagon and other government agencies and greater attention by defense officials to securing the peace. The report recommends setting up "some process for exposing senior officials to possibilities other than those being assumed in their planning."
