Post by Moses on Dec 28, 2004 20:58:58 GMT -5
Phillip Carter and Owen West, both of the now WaPo-owned Slate, wrote yesterday that "After factoring in medical, doctrinal, and technological improvements, infantry duty in Iraq circa 2004 comes out just as intense as infantry duty in Vietnam circa 1966—and in some cases more lethal."
Before going into the details, though, Carter and West pause to elbow The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which last July wrote that "it would take over 73 years for US forces to incur the level of combat deaths suffered in the Vietnam war."
Carter and West write that "Today's grunts are patrolling a battlefield every bit as deadly as the crucible their fathers faced in Southeast Asia."
Their data comes from a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine, in which Atul Gawande concludes that the rate of fatalities in Iraq has everything to do with improvements in technology and little, or nothing, to do with the severity of combat.
We start by arriving at a "lethality of wounds" rate for various wars. In World War II this rate was 30 percent — thirty percent of those wounded died of those wounds. For all major conflicts from Korea to the first Gulf War, including Vietnam, the rate "hovered between 24 percent and 25 percent."
But in Gulf War Redux the lethality of wounds rate is only ten percent. This is a notable achievement on the part of battlefield surgeons, Army medics and Navy corpsmen. Ten percent is, historically, an incredibly low lethalty rate. The efforts of these medical professionals, combined with new body and vehicle armor, together with new doctrine, have decreased significantly the fatality rate of combat for American soldiers. "Simply," Carter and West write, "a soldier was nearly 1.5 times more likely to die from his wounds in Vietnam than in Iraq today."
So let's take another year from Vietnam. In 1966 5,008 American servicemembers were killed in action while 1,045 more died from "non-hostile" wounds. In Iraq, since January 1, 2004, 754 servicemembers have been KIA and 142 more have died from these "non-hostile" incidents.
In 1966 there were 385,000 American troops in Vietnam. In 2004 there have been about 142,000 troops in Iraq at any given time. In 1966 29,992 American servicemembers were wounded in action.
By applying Vietnam's lethality rate of 25 percent to Iraq's casualty figures we come to a 2004 KIA total of 1,131.
The rate of casualty inflation in Iraq can be seen in a chart of fatalities produced by Ed Stephan, and in a similar graph of wounded. Another good source of trend data is from iCasualties.org, which features a trends page based on Lunaville's casualty database.
At any rate, Carter and West engage in some direct comparison between Vietnam and Iraq. They take two signature battles: Hue in 1968 and Fallujah in 2004 and compare casualty rates.
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We passed 1964 numbers some time ago. Now, "Iraq 2004 looks like Vietnam 1966" when we adjust for technological improvement in the 38 intervening years.
Carter and West — both military men — write that "the proportional burden on the infantryman is at its highest level since World War I."
And casualties — wounded and killed — keep going up. At this rate it won't take 73 years for US forces to incur the level of combat deaths suffered in the Vietnam war. It'll only take more of the same.
www.warblogging.com/archives/000998.php#000998
Before going into the details, though, Carter and West pause to elbow The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which last July wrote that "it would take over 73 years for US forces to incur the level of combat deaths suffered in the Vietnam war."
Carter and West write that "Today's grunts are patrolling a battlefield every bit as deadly as the crucible their fathers faced in Southeast Asia."
Their data comes from a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine, in which Atul Gawande concludes that the rate of fatalities in Iraq has everything to do with improvements in technology and little, or nothing, to do with the severity of combat.
We start by arriving at a "lethality of wounds" rate for various wars. In World War II this rate was 30 percent — thirty percent of those wounded died of those wounds. For all major conflicts from Korea to the first Gulf War, including Vietnam, the rate "hovered between 24 percent and 25 percent."
But in Gulf War Redux the lethality of wounds rate is only ten percent. This is a notable achievement on the part of battlefield surgeons, Army medics and Navy corpsmen. Ten percent is, historically, an incredibly low lethalty rate. The efforts of these medical professionals, combined with new body and vehicle armor, together with new doctrine, have decreased significantly the fatality rate of combat for American soldiers. "Simply," Carter and West write, "a soldier was nearly 1.5 times more likely to die from his wounds in Vietnam than in Iraq today."
So let's take another year from Vietnam. In 1966 5,008 American servicemembers were killed in action while 1,045 more died from "non-hostile" wounds. In Iraq, since January 1, 2004, 754 servicemembers have been KIA and 142 more have died from these "non-hostile" incidents.
In 1966 there were 385,000 American troops in Vietnam. In 2004 there have been about 142,000 troops in Iraq at any given time. In 1966 29,992 American servicemembers were wounded in action.
By applying Vietnam's lethality rate of 25 percent to Iraq's casualty figures we come to a 2004 KIA total of 1,131.
The rate of casualty inflation in Iraq can be seen in a chart of fatalities produced by Ed Stephan, and in a similar graph of wounded. Another good source of trend data is from iCasualties.org, which features a trends page based on Lunaville's casualty database.
At any rate, Carter and West engage in some direct comparison between Vietnam and Iraq. They take two signature battles: Hue in 1968 and Fallujah in 2004 and compare casualty rates.
The Hue comparison is illuminating. In Hue, three Marine battalions (roughly 3,000 men) plunged into a vicious house-to-house fight with 12,000 North Vietnamese, ultimately routing them after suffering harsh losses. In April 2004, three Marine battalions attacked several thousand terrorists in Fallujah and were days away from taking the city when the White House called off the attack. In November, three new Marine battalions joined two Army mechanized infantry battalions in a sweeping attack to retake the city. They succeeded, although outbreaks of fighting continue. While the North Vietnamese fought a coordinated defensive battle for Hue City until they were annihilated, the terrorists in Fallujah fought in small packs, hiding among the tens of thousands of structures in the "city of mosques." In the three-week battle for Hue, 147 Marines were killed and 857 wounded. In the twin battles for Fallujah, more than 104 soldiers and Marines have been killed and more than 1,100 wounded in a battle that will continue to take lives, like the three Marines who encountered yet another pocket of fighters last week.
We passed 1964 numbers some time ago. Now, "Iraq 2004 looks like Vietnam 1966" when we adjust for technological improvement in the 38 intervening years.
Carter and West — both military men — write that "the proportional burden on the infantryman is at its highest level since World War I."
And casualties — wounded and killed — keep going up. At this rate it won't take 73 years for US forces to incur the level of combat deaths suffered in the Vietnam war. It'll only take more of the same.
www.warblogging.com/archives/000998.php#000998