The National Interest—Spring 2004 39 (A Hollinger Empire Publication)
Does Iraq Matter?i[Morton AbramowitzMorton Abramowitz is a Senior Fellow at The
Century Foundation and former President of
the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.“....Both of these basic propositions—that leaving is catastrophic and succeeding would transform the region—are usually asserted with vehemence, as if somehow they are intrinsically true, but they are rarely examined....”<br>
“....But the unfamiliar, difficult situation in Iraq and our declining ability
to influence events needs sober assessment... Indeed, it can be
argued that staying indefinitely in Iraq in such difficult circumstances can lead both to greater costs and greater embarrassment to the United States. A great nation has the capacity to pursue ambitious objectives but also to reconsider the costs involved in the pursuit of those objectives as well as to handle adversity and take compensating measures to reduce the consequences of adversity. The central
issues revolve around, first, the costs and benefits of staying or leaving Iraq early and, second, weighing the uncertainties of the consequences under any option. That is hard to do under any circumstance, particularly domestic political ones, when we are already deeply involved in pursuing tough, desirable objectives.
In dealing with the first assumption, it is not easy to define what “not staying the course” means. ....What constitutes progress in Iraq now
seems to be a moving target. “<br>“....Yet many believe that any early departure from Iraq in uncertain circumstances is unlikely in a Bush Administration, particularly
since the domestic political costs of a sizeable military presence do not yet appear great, while those of failure, on the contrary, do.”<br>
“.... Hanoi is of course not as strategically important as Baghdad....America’s preeminent power position in the world can endure an early withdrawal from Iraq. “<br>
There is no great confidence anywhere
that the United States can produce a
desirable political outcome in Iraq.• The occupation of Iraq has increased terrorism in Iraq, given terrorists training and provided terrorist leaders another cause to encourage people around the world to march under their banner. Our ability, however, to diminish terrorist activity is not principally dependent on what we do in Iraq, particularly with Al-Qaeda still loose in the world. It depends far more on our worldwide cooperation and on dealing more effectively with our friends—notably Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, where the threat from terrorism and the diffusion of WMD is and was greater than in Iraq—rather than with our enemies.
• ....Probably the greatest psychological impact would be on the
smaller, more vulnerable Gulf states, which have been dependent on the
United States and where the United States has bases. We will of course be concerned with the area’s oil-producing states and the need to keep oil flowing— including Iraq’s. ....That of course does not mean that the coziness
of past relations will continue. This coziness is already fading. Indeed, in the short run, still friendly states can be weakened by a continuing heavy American military presence in Iraq and our stated determination to bring democracy to the Arab world.
•....We have witnessed, not surprisingly, a new alliance of sorts between Turkey, Iran and Syria dedicated to keeping Iraq together and preventing the Kurds from achieving their aspirations for independence, implying perhaps an introduction of forces to prevent that from happening once the Americans have departed. Saudi Arabia will be most worried about a Shi‘a takeover, growing Iranian influence in Iraq and what happens to Iraq’s Sunni minority. ....One thing is clear: the U.S. military will one day leave Iraq, leaving Turkey and Iran as the most powerful states in the area.
•....Some hedging may happen as with China, but that is already taking place in Southeast Asia and South Korea, not because of our involvement in Iraq but because of China’s increasing regional and even global role and the fact that our own
attention to terrorism seems to have eclipsed many of our other interests in Asia. ....All these uncertainties need to be weighed against the costs of a sustained indefinite effort in Iraq. These include the relatively low but continuing and
somewhat hidden number of casualties, enormous military and reconstruction expenses (the latter possibly producing great regional economic stimulus much like the Korean and Vietnam wars), huge absorption of the time of senior officials,
the continuing abrasions with close allies, and the sidelining of other domestic and foreign priorities. There is also domestic division if not polarization over our Iraq venture. “<br>
“Weighing uncertainties is not our biggest strength, particularly in areas with
which we are not familiar. Senior policy makers usually have little confidence in letting the intelligence community do so on difficult issues, and so end up choosing those intelligence judgments that further their policy objectives. Once an administration —any administration—embarks for
whatever reason on a major and costly policy venture, loyalty and single-mindedness take over. Candor and introspection fall by the wayside. Nothing much matters except the pursuit of the goal; the fear of the domestic political repercussions of failure reinforces that mindset. Reversal is very difficult. Great determination is, of course, important in pursuing difficult tasks and hesitation and doubt do not usually further
the goal. Success is the ultimate arbiter but the costs could be great. Successful or not, Iraq has added some poison to our national
life, particularly over the origins and wisdom of the war and the capabilities and integrity of our intelligence system.
....Administration statements on the purpose of the Iraq War have covered the waterfront. Emphasis has moved from Iraq’s WMD, a connection to terrorists and violation of UN resolutions to a humanitarian
intervention to an emphasis that invasion would spur radical change in the Middle East (including, over the long term, the establishment of democracy in the area). It is the last assertion which is catching increased public international attention.”<br>
‘....As for Libya, Qaddafi may well have been frightened by the invasion of
Iraq, but he has been trying for years to reenter the international system to shore up his economy. Arabs will also notice that the
United States is pleased that he is giving up his WMD efforts, but the cautious praise of his regime promotes skepticism about the strength of our commitment to democracy. ....Before major combat operations
began, President Bush declared that “success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle East peace and set in motion progress toward a truly democratic Palestinian state.”
While the American
removal of Saddam reduced the military threat to Israel, so far there is little evidence that it is changing attitudes in the Middle East on the Arab-Israeli conflict, including those in Iraq, or that it has
much promise of doing so in the future. Indeed, many Arabs apparently feel that the United States has its priorities wrong, that going after Saddam was a diversion from dealing with what was much more on their mind and more politically potent for them, the Arab-Israeli conflict.”<br>
“....There is no great confidence anywhere that the United States can produce a stable, desirable and durable political outcome in Iraq.”
“....Development of democracy in the Arab world will depend more on internal political and economic developments of individual states than what happens in Iraq. Indeed, instability in Iraq could encourage
a reaction against democratization in some Arab states. ....Sustained
practical Western programs to promote democracy, human rights, civil society and independent media should also help. There is a good chance over time we will see better and more reformist Arab governments.
But to assert that the occupation of Iraq will produce democracy in
Iraq, which will then spread like a virus to other countries in the Middle East, is more prayer than analysis. The invasion of Iraq was in great part a role of the dice.
The only certain consequence was an end to the Saddam Hussein regime—an unmitigated blessing
—and to its potential military threats to its neighbors. But beyond that, there were no certainties and apparently little introspection and analysis in the top ranks of the executive branch.[/u] ....Iraq policy is now increasingly a response to developments on the ground
there and the vagaries of our domestic politics.
Ending the Arab-Israel conflict would have far more influence on transforming
the Arab world than creating a new Iraqi government.Knowing what we now know about Iraq, one could make the argument that we would have been better off if we had spent only a fraction of
the hundreds of billions our Iraq venture will end up costingus in bribing Arabs and Israelis into a settlement and enforcing it.
....History...shows that short-term military occupations
have rarely produced successful nation-building. “
Staying the course”might just mean digging in. The best that can be said with some certainty is that to stay or leave Iraq is going to be messy, costly and engage our energies and public discussion for a long time to come. °?<br>The National Interest—Spring 2004 44
Article completed on February 17, 2004.
www.tcf.org/Publications/InternationalAffairs/ Abramowitz_TNI.pdf
Maybe one or both of them would've found a way to use it against Clark since there's no way he could be involved with something like that and have no idea at all what it does.