Post by POA on Apr 26, 2004 3:59:43 GMT -5
"The disaster in Iraq and constructive criticism"
Printed on Thursday, April 22, 2004 @ 00:09:34 CST ( )
By Gabriel Ash
YellowTimes.org Columnist (United States)
(YellowTimes.org) – "So what do you propose?" That is the question hurled at us critics of the war. Presumably, being right about the war so far is "irrelevant" now. We must be judged by giving sound, practical advice that can make the best of a bad fix.
First, that we were right about the war should not be so easily dismissed. We were right because we analyzed the U.S. government objectively, while Thomas Friedman and the "give war a chance" crowd was looking at things through a dark glass of misplaced piousness. Has a lesson been learned? No it hasn't. The mainstream media, the 9/11 Commission, the Democrats and the liberal and conservative pundits are critical of the failures of the Administration. But with few exceptions, they still assume that the goals of the White House were and are noble. Since that very assumption is the cause of error, those who gave wrong advice will continue to be wrong.
There is a new "wisdom" that begins to unite some faux lefties and some old defense hands. According to this new wisdom, the failure in Iraq is the result of too much optimism, but optimism of a specific kind. Supposedly, had we only understood that Iraq was just "not ready for democracy," had we only sent twice as many soldiers, and given them a simple mission, such as to put in charge a friendly dictator and get out, everything might be different.
The warmonger's haven "National Review" now faults the Administration for the "overestimation in particular of the sophistication of what is fundamentally still a tribal society." Thomas Friedman's new tune is quite similar: we made mistakes, but the Iraqis failed to show up.
John Kerry follows the same line. He is critical of "the way" the war was fought. To prove his point, he has backed from calling the war crimes he, himself, committed thirty years ago "atrocities." Perhaps the new p.c. term for burning villages and their inhabitants should be "robust landscaping." Moral clarity is, of course, no longer a priority, now that Marine snipers are taking potshots at women, children and ambulance drivers in Falluja. But Kerry has an eye for the future, too. A candidate who prepares to spend his term in office burning cities should be careful how he describes burning villages.
It was just a question of time before the exhilaration of empire would turn into the melancholy of murder. In less than a year, giddiness morphed into somber anxiety. But the one thing that remained constant is the self-righteousness of the American public discourse. We're back to faulting the natives for their stubborn refusal to understand the purity of our hearts. And hell hasn't seen the wrath of a heart-broken colonialist. Iraqis must learn now, as did Native Americans, African slaves, Vietnamese and Palestinian peasants, and many others, that ingratitude is a capital offense.
Miracles apparently now happen in pairs. Just as the new anti-American wisdom in Iraq unites Shia and Sunni Muslims, so in the U.S. the neo "anti-Wilsonianism" unites populist racism with the cynicism of the old style imperialists. The dismal results of the neo-con coup are about to stir a wave of nostalgia for the good old days of Kissinger, Suharto and Pinochet. Bush's messianic lunacy is losing its luster, but only so that we can go back to what the U.S. knows best --¬ what William Blum calls "killing hope," i.e. destroying indigenous liberation movements and installing and supporting U.S.-friendly, mass murderers.
Although Bush understandably isn't very loud about it, the change of tune is even noticeable in the Administration's future plans for Iraq. Exit neo-con Paul Bremer; enter death squads aficionado John Negroponte.
What went wrong?
The trouble with the new, old wisdom is that it is as wrong as the old, new wisdom. The mess in Iraq is not the fault of Iraqis. On the contrary, most Iraqis were happy to see Saddam gone. Despite suspicions, the majority of Iraqis were ready to give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, most Iraqis wanted, and probably still want, a stable, independent, pluralistic Iraq. Even more important is that the public leadership with the greatest level of legitimacy in Iraq, the Shi'a clergy, was and is supportive of a pluralistic and democratic Iraq. The leading clergy of Iraq, especially Al-Sistani, reject the theocratic Iranian model, put a premium on public order and consider political violence legitimate only as a last resort. To be sure, they were difficulties in Iraq that any foreign intervention would have faced but, over all, the U.S. could have stumbled on worse "nation building" projects.
Nor is it true that one country cannot liberate another by military intervention. The U.S. did liberate France from Nazi occupation; Vietnam did liberate Cambodia from the Khmer Rouge; India did liberate Bangladesh from a Pakistani genocide. These were all liberations achieved by armed, foreign intervention.
The most important causes of the current unfolding disaster are rather the occupation's goals and attitudes -- racism and bad faith.
The biggest problem the U.S. occupation faced was mistrust. Iraqis were aware of the history of U.S. support for Saddam, including Bush Sr.'s betrayal of the Shi'a rebels in 1991. They were also aware of U.S. support for Israel and anti-Arab policies in general. To succeed, Bremer and his team had to address Iraqi mistrust head on by being super cautious in showing deference and respect for Iraqis, their wishes, their understanding of the situation and their culture. Instead, the U.S. occupation followed the assumption that Americans knew best. U.S. officials determined the vision of what Iraq should become and how it should get there. Even momentous decisions, such as disbanding the army and attacking Falluja, were taken without input from Iraqis. Iraqis were invited to participate based on their willingness to accept U.S. impositions rather than based on their popular legitimacy. Instead of increased caution and sensitivity, Bremer's occupation demonstrated a heightened level of patronizing and obtuseness.
U.S. sense of cultural superiority is a feature of Washington and of the nation as a whole. But the Bush administration is unique in that its policies are fashioned mostly by a group of neo-con ideologues. Paul Bremer, the appointed pro-consul of Iraq, is one of them, and so are his bosses, Wolfowitz and Feith. The neo-cons are fervent supporters of Israel's Likud party and its racism toward Palestinians. Israeli racism is part of their world view.
Indeed, one needs only go back to key neo-con texts to discover the depth of contempt for Arabs that animates the neo-con mind. Take for example this passage from "A Clean Break," the now infamous position paper written by Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and other neo-cons on behalf of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:
"King Hussein may have ideas for Israel in bringing its Lebanon problem under control. The predominantly Shi'a population of southern Lebanon has been tied for centuries to the Shi'a leadership in Najaf, Iraq rather than Iran. Were the Hashemites to control Iraq, they could use their influence over Najaf to help Israel wean the South Lebanese Shi'a away from Hizballah, Iran, and Syria. Shi'a retain strong ties to the Hashemites: the Shi'a venerate foremost the Prophet's family, the direct descendants of which -- and in whose veins the blood of the Prophet flows -- is King Hussein."
Translation: Shi'a Arabs are opposed to Israel because they are a dimwitted herd who follow the leader with the best blood lineage. But that can work both ways. To make them love Israel, all one needs is a pro-Israeli king with blood ties to the prophet Mohammad.
After a full year of being ruled by people with such deep "understanding" of the Middle East, is there any surprise that Iraqis are revolting?
Neo-con racism precluded acknowledging Arab grievances against U.S. and Israeli policy. There was, therefore, no other way to make sense of Iraqi mistrust except as misguided "anti-Americanism." No surprise then that Bremer and his crew thought they could overcome Iraqi suspicions by such patronizing means as a new TV station. There is a short distance from that to the deluded doctrine, which the neo-cons learned from their Israeli friends and teachers, that "Arabs understand only force."
Another result of neo-con racism was that people with knowledge of the Middle East and even minimal sympathy toward Arab concerns were excluded from consultations. Even the mild officers of the State Departments were shunned. We know now from insider accounts how the neo-cons excluded State expertise and work in the preparation for the war (including the prescient warning of large scale looting following the collapse of the regime), and how they replaced regional intelligence experts with pro-Israel ideologues. The predictable result was a know-nothing administration in Iraq, and it shows.
[rest in followup]