Post by Moses on Mar 1, 2005 3:06:32 GMT -5
<br> Southeast Asia
Mar 1, 2005[/color]
The battle on terror's second front
By Yeo Weimeng
The recent car bombing in Thailand that killed five people and wounded more than 44 has once again highlighted the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia. Though much has been written about the dangers posed by terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, there is hardly any analysis of the US counter-terrorism strategy in the region, which has been dubbed by the George W Bush administration as the "second front on the war on terror".
Is America winning the second front on the "war on terror"? The answer appears to be mixed. It is true that with American's assistance and support, Southeast Asian countries have been successful in eliminating terrorist networks in the region; nevertheless, American's unilateral actions, such as the war in Iraq, have alienated Muslim populations within Southeast Asia, thereby generating the "political oxygen" that militant radicals exploit to reinforce their ideology. Thus, though America is succeeding in the military dimension of the "war on terror", it appears to be losing the ideological one. However, before we continue it would be prudent to know what the terrorism threat is in Southeast Asia.
The threat
Southeast Asia is no stranger to the threat of terrorism. For instance, several countries in the region were vulnerable to various communist insurgency groups in the 1970s and 1980s. However, what is new in Southeast Asia today is the increase in religion-inspired militant terrorism, particularly from extreme militant Islamic groups. These groups are linked with like-minded groups across the Malaya archipelago. For example, in Southeast Asia, in contrast to other parts of the world, the phenomenon of al-Qaeda has been nuanced by the regional presence of one of its indigenous branches, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
This radical Islamic organization spans the territories of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Through its Rabitatul Mujahideen (Mujahideen Coalition) co-coordinating framework, JI also has operational links between al-Qaeda and other regional militant groups - the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) in Malaysia and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in Myanmar. JI-orchestrated bombings and martyrdom operations have taken place throughout the region, targeting both American interests and local citizens, as seen from the bombings in Jakarta and Bali.
US successes
By isolating and arresting militants as well as closing down terrorist networks' functional space, countries in Southeast Asia, with the assistance of the US, have been relatively successful in removing the environment in which terrorists groups operate in the region. The US has cooperated with countries in the region through various multilateral and bilateral frameworks.
At the multilateral level, the US, under the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism, has worked together with the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries in intelligence sharing, implementing joint counter-terrorism regimes and enhancing liaison among their respective law enforcement agencies. Such initiatives are successful against terrorist networks as they disrupt these networks from extra financial and operational assistance.
The US has also assisted Southeast Asian countries through multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Under the auspices of the US, several workshops under the ARF framework have taken place. One example is the Malaysia-US workshop on financial measures against terrorism that was held in Honolulu from March 24-26, 2002. These meetings are important to the US's "war on terror" as they allow the best practices in the area to be showcased and expertise tapped as well as providing a useful platform for valuable networking.
America has also worked with Southeast Asian countries outside the ARF and ASEAN frameworks. One example of such cooperation is the regional counter-terrorism center in Malaysia over which the US and Malaysia have been in liaison. In addition, the US continues to promote security multilateralism in its various annual military exercises in Southeast Asia. In 2002, the US Pacific Command organized Team Challenge 2002, which linked the Philippine Balikatan exercises with Cobra Gold in Thailand.
On the bilateral level, US assistance has been instrumental in upgrading the skills of the Philippine armed forces and equipping them with better equipment. These efforts are reported to have significantly weakened the MILF, as well as the notorious Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. Other countries in Southeast Asia have also taken part in US bilateral cooperation. Malaysia, which is not renowned for its pro-American views, has engaged in intelligence cooperation with the US through a bilateral US-Malaysia Anti-Terrorism Pact signed in May 2002, while Indonesia was promised a grant of US$47 million to upgrade its police force, including the establishment of a special counter-terrorism unit.
Apart from these official channels, there has also been crucial informal cooperation between countries in Southeast Asia and the US. For Washington, an early dividend from such informal cooperation came in the form of the arrest of Kuwaiti al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq, whom the Indonesians turned over to the US Central Intelligence Agency in 2002. Another key success was the 2003 arrest by Thai anti-terrorism forces and the CIA of Hambali, a top al-Qaeda strategist and key figure in the 2002 Bali bombing.
US failures
Though the US counter-terrorism strategy has been effective in curtailing the functional space in which terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah operate, it fails to counter the radical ideology with which such group are imbued. This is a strategic mistake, as a surviving ideology serves to resuscitate a terrorist group by providing a stream of willing recruits to replace those who were captured or eliminated. In other words, to eradicate the underlying conditions in which terrorist groups flourish, it is essential not only to remove terrorism's functional space but it is imperative that we discredit its ideology as well.
How to counter terrorist ideology
First, it is essential to remove local root causes of terrorism. It must be noted that terrorism is not only a military problem but a social and economical one. As a result, America must go beyond military assistance. For example, the US should spearhead international efforts to assist poorer Southeast Asian countries in providing programs aimed in alleviating poverty and unemployment.
Implementing such polices would no doubt reduce discontent among disgruntled communities and undercut the appeal of the terrorist's ideology.
More importantly, it is essential that the US win over the hearts and minds of regional Muslim communities. The worsening of the Israeli-Palestine issue, the US occupation in Iraq and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal have increase the "political oxygen" that fuels anti-Americanism, causing an increase of recruits to Islamist groups. As a result, for America to succeed in the "war on terror", it is essential for the US to identify and remove these sources of anti-Americanism. Apart from making sure that the Israeli-Palestine dispute is justly resolved and ensuring that Iraq, together with Afghanistan, emerge as modern democratic states, which by any means is no easy task, Washington must make certain that its public diplomacy highlights how American forces are not the "Great Satan" of the world and have genuinely assisted Muslims communities across the globe such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is only by confronting and eliminating such sources of "political oxygen" that the US can curb the ideological dimension of such terrorist groups.
Conclusion
The US's "war on terror" in Southeast Asia has been rather successful in the short term. The US, with cooperation from Southeast Asian countries through bilateral and multilateral frameworks, has curbed the operational and functional capabilities of terrorism groups in the region by arresting senior operatives and disrupting their respective cells and networks. However, in the long run, US progress on the "war on terror" has been poor, as it overemphasizes short-term counter-terrorist measures at the expense of more important longer-term counter-terrorism measures such as winning the hearts and minds of Muslim communities in the region. As a result, the US fails to tackle the more important aspects of the "war on terror", the ideological and political dimensions. If the US does not develop a multi-prong approach against this security threat, the "war on terror" will likely be a long and arduous one.
Yeo Weimeng, a former research analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, currently is working toward his master's degree at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC.
(Copyright 2005 Yeo Weimeng)
Mar 1, 2005[/color]
The battle on terror's second front
By Yeo Weimeng
The recent car bombing in Thailand that killed five people and wounded more than 44 has once again highlighted the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia. Though much has been written about the dangers posed by terrorist groups in Southeast Asia, there is hardly any analysis of the US counter-terrorism strategy in the region, which has been dubbed by the George W Bush administration as the "second front on the war on terror".
Is America winning the second front on the "war on terror"? The answer appears to be mixed. It is true that with American's assistance and support, Southeast Asian countries have been successful in eliminating terrorist networks in the region; nevertheless, American's unilateral actions, such as the war in Iraq, have alienated Muslim populations within Southeast Asia, thereby generating the "political oxygen" that militant radicals exploit to reinforce their ideology. Thus, though America is succeeding in the military dimension of the "war on terror", it appears to be losing the ideological one. However, before we continue it would be prudent to know what the terrorism threat is in Southeast Asia.
The threat
Southeast Asia is no stranger to the threat of terrorism. For instance, several countries in the region were vulnerable to various communist insurgency groups in the 1970s and 1980s. However, what is new in Southeast Asia today is the increase in religion-inspired militant terrorism, particularly from extreme militant Islamic groups. These groups are linked with like-minded groups across the Malaya archipelago. For example, in Southeast Asia, in contrast to other parts of the world, the phenomenon of al-Qaeda has been nuanced by the regional presence of one of its indigenous branches, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).
This radical Islamic organization spans the territories of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. Through its Rabitatul Mujahideen (Mujahideen Coalition) co-coordinating framework, JI also has operational links between al-Qaeda and other regional militant groups - the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, Laskar Jundullah in Indonesia, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) in Malaysia and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in Myanmar. JI-orchestrated bombings and martyrdom operations have taken place throughout the region, targeting both American interests and local citizens, as seen from the bombings in Jakarta and Bali.
US successes
By isolating and arresting militants as well as closing down terrorist networks' functional space, countries in Southeast Asia, with the assistance of the US, have been relatively successful in removing the environment in which terrorists groups operate in the region. The US has cooperated with countries in the region through various multilateral and bilateral frameworks.
At the multilateral level, the US, under the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism, has worked together with the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries in intelligence sharing, implementing joint counter-terrorism regimes and enhancing liaison among their respective law enforcement agencies. Such initiatives are successful against terrorist networks as they disrupt these networks from extra financial and operational assistance.
The US has also assisted Southeast Asian countries through multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Under the auspices of the US, several workshops under the ARF framework have taken place. One example is the Malaysia-US workshop on financial measures against terrorism that was held in Honolulu from March 24-26, 2002. These meetings are important to the US's "war on terror" as they allow the best practices in the area to be showcased and expertise tapped as well as providing a useful platform for valuable networking.
America has also worked with Southeast Asian countries outside the ARF and ASEAN frameworks. One example of such cooperation is the regional counter-terrorism center in Malaysia over which the US and Malaysia have been in liaison. In addition, the US continues to promote security multilateralism in its various annual military exercises in Southeast Asia. In 2002, the US Pacific Command organized Team Challenge 2002, which linked the Philippine Balikatan exercises with Cobra Gold in Thailand.
On the bilateral level, US assistance has been instrumental in upgrading the skills of the Philippine armed forces and equipping them with better equipment. These efforts are reported to have significantly weakened the MILF, as well as the notorious Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. Other countries in Southeast Asia have also taken part in US bilateral cooperation. Malaysia, which is not renowned for its pro-American views, has engaged in intelligence cooperation with the US through a bilateral US-Malaysia Anti-Terrorism Pact signed in May 2002, while Indonesia was promised a grant of US$47 million to upgrade its police force, including the establishment of a special counter-terrorism unit.
Apart from these official channels, there has also been crucial informal cooperation between countries in Southeast Asia and the US. For Washington, an early dividend from such informal cooperation came in the form of the arrest of Kuwaiti al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq, whom the Indonesians turned over to the US Central Intelligence Agency in 2002. Another key success was the 2003 arrest by Thai anti-terrorism forces and the CIA of Hambali, a top al-Qaeda strategist and key figure in the 2002 Bali bombing.
US failures
Though the US counter-terrorism strategy has been effective in curtailing the functional space in which terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah operate, it fails to counter the radical ideology with which such group are imbued. This is a strategic mistake, as a surviving ideology serves to resuscitate a terrorist group by providing a stream of willing recruits to replace those who were captured or eliminated. In other words, to eradicate the underlying conditions in which terrorist groups flourish, it is essential not only to remove terrorism's functional space but it is imperative that we discredit its ideology as well.
How to counter terrorist ideology
First, it is essential to remove local root causes of terrorism. It must be noted that terrorism is not only a military problem but a social and economical one. As a result, America must go beyond military assistance. For example, the US should spearhead international efforts to assist poorer Southeast Asian countries in providing programs aimed in alleviating poverty and unemployment.
Implementing such polices would no doubt reduce discontent among disgruntled communities and undercut the appeal of the terrorist's ideology.
More importantly, it is essential that the US win over the hearts and minds of regional Muslim communities. The worsening of the Israeli-Palestine issue, the US occupation in Iraq and the Abu Ghraib prison scandal have increase the "political oxygen" that fuels anti-Americanism, causing an increase of recruits to Islamist groups. As a result, for America to succeed in the "war on terror", it is essential for the US to identify and remove these sources of anti-Americanism. Apart from making sure that the Israeli-Palestine dispute is justly resolved and ensuring that Iraq, together with Afghanistan, emerge as modern democratic states, which by any means is no easy task, Washington must make certain that its public diplomacy highlights how American forces are not the "Great Satan" of the world and have genuinely assisted Muslims communities across the globe such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is only by confronting and eliminating such sources of "political oxygen" that the US can curb the ideological dimension of such terrorist groups.
Conclusion
The US's "war on terror" in Southeast Asia has been rather successful in the short term. The US, with cooperation from Southeast Asian countries through bilateral and multilateral frameworks, has curbed the operational and functional capabilities of terrorism groups in the region by arresting senior operatives and disrupting their respective cells and networks. However, in the long run, US progress on the "war on terror" has been poor, as it overemphasizes short-term counter-terrorist measures at the expense of more important longer-term counter-terrorism measures such as winning the hearts and minds of Muslim communities in the region. As a result, the US fails to tackle the more important aspects of the "war on terror", the ideological and political dimensions. If the US does not develop a multi-prong approach against this security threat, the "war on terror" will likely be a long and arduous one.
Yeo Weimeng, a former research analyst at the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, currently is working toward his master's degree at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC.
(Copyright 2005 Yeo Weimeng)