John Scarlett knew war pretexts were invented

[Moses]

May 01, 2005
The secret Downing Street memo

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY



DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.

This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

---

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary [Straw] said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.



The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.



(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)



MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)

[Moses]

Daily Mail

But the most serious charge against Mr Blair - and one that has damaged Britain far more than his public mis-spending - is, quite simply, that he has undermined the integrity of our institutions and, indeed, our very democratic process.

His performance on ITV1 this week said it all. Without a blush he told us he had never claimed that Saddam Hussein was a threat to this country. This was simply untrue - but then, it came from a man who can no longer distinguish between truth and falsehood.

Iraq, of course, isn't an aberration in this Prime Minister's career. The arrogance, carelessness with the truth, and flawed judgment he showed when misleading Britain into war is part of a pattern that goes all the way back to the Bernie Ecclestone affair, in 1997.

This is the politician who promised to be 'purer than pure', but who has been up to his neck in sleaze ever since, from Ecclestone to the Hindujas and Lakshmi Mittal to Geoffrey Robinson.

This is the leader who twice brought back Peter Mandelson after scandals, most recently and disgracefully appointing him our Commissioner in Brussels.

This is the autocrat who ruthlessly politicised our once proudly impartial civil service, sending his liar-in-chief Alastair Campbell to bully and bluster and corrupt decent standards in Whitehall.

This is the Premier who has consistently treated the Commons with contempt, who tried to neuter the Lords and is now packing our Second Chamber with cronies and placemen to act as his rubber stamp.

This is the 'reformer' who tried to abolish the ancient post of Lord Chancellor without telling the Queen, Parliament or anyone else, even though the post is central to the working of our constitution.

Election deceits

This is the man who presided over a crazed vendetta against the BBC, and who used compliant officials to present secret intelligence for propagandist purposes - rewarding one of them, John Scarlett, with a promotion to run MI6.

This is the Prime Minister who, in the greatest of all election deceits, has the effrontery to present himself as the bosom buddy of Chancellor Brown, who famously and bitterly remarked to Blair: "There is nothing you could ever say to me that I would ever believe."

This is the politician who again and again in this election has told untruths about Tory spending 'cuts' and non-existent plans to 'charge' for NHS operations.

Much more seriously, this is the national leader who knowingly exposed this election to the very real possibility of fraud by recklessly expanding our system of postal voting and rejecting every warning of the dangers. And he invited this corruption in the hope of winning grubby party advantage.

But it is Iraq that sums up Mr Blair at his worst: the dodgy dossiers, the wildly exaggerated intelligence, the trampling on legal advice and now the rewriting of history.