The Democrats' right-wing follies (Part I)

[POA]

The Democrats' right-wing follies

Democrats could take a lesson from history:
When they lean right, they lose

Paul Rockwell

George Bush eats centrist Democrats for breakfast. Senator John Kerry is a centrist, and as Michael Moore puts it: "We cannot leave the 2004 election to the Democrats to screw it up."

Ever since the demise of the once-progressive Johnson administration in 1968, when a lawless war on Vietnam destroyed the hopeful war on poverty, centrist Democrats have blamed the misfortunes of the Democratic Party in national politics on excessive liberalism, on progressive politics that appear too radical for the general population. Centrists claim that only by moving the party to the right, even to the point of co-opting nationalism and military postures of the Republicans, can Democrats regain the White House.

The centrist theory, so often repeated in media commentary, contradicts the historical record—not only the record of three successive defeats in presidential elections from 1980 to 1988, when the party shifted to the right—but the overall record of Democratic presidents from Roosevelt to Carter. Since 1932 Democratic presidential candidates have achieved five landslide victories, and all five landslides were created through progressive campaigns that identified the Democratic Party with movements for social reform. The four campaigns of Franklin Roosevelt and the landslide victory of Lyndon Johnson in 1964 were grand coalition campaigns. These great crusades did not dwell on the white middle-class. Nor did they fawn over lost Democrats. Instead they reached beyond the party establishment to the unemployed, to the poor, to the new, rising electorate of the times.

With only one telling exception, no Cold War Democratic candidate ever won a decisive majority of the popular vote. Truman got 49.5 percent in 1948; Kennedy got 49.9 percent in the squeaker of 1960. Carter got a bare majority over Ford in 1976, a result of public hostility over Watergate. The one candidate who did sweep the country was Lyndon Johnson, and he made support for civil rights central to his crusade for the Great Society. The great Democratic victories (Roosevelt and Johnson) were all progressive, highly ideological crusades against poverty and injustice.

History does not vindicate the viewpoint of the right-wing Democrats. The centrist theory is wrong, not only in terms of electoral results; it is also wrong in terms of those huge fiascos that brought down three Democratic presidents—Truman, Johnson, and Carter. While fidelity of FDR to progressive causes kept him in the White House for four terms in a row, no Cold War Democratic president kept the White House beyond a single elected term. The policies and mistakes of Democrats in office set the conditions for subsequent elections. What did the presidents of one elected term—Truman, Johnson, Carter—do wrong in office? The answer to that question tends to discredit the centrist position. Every one-term Democratic president made right-wing errors that precipitated his own downfall and betrayed the liberal mandate that held the Democratic Party together. The fall of Truman in 1952, the humiliation of Lyndon Johnson in 1968, the defeat of Carter in 1980—great Democratic traumas—were all direct results of right wing follies in office.

McCarthyism and War Crippled Truman

As a New Dealer, Truman was popular, but Truman made a right-wing shift away from FDR: the establishment of a conservative cabinet, the use of troops and injunctions against steel workers and miners on strike, the red-baiting of Henry Wallace, the State Department persecution of Paul Robeson, Truman's reactionary government loyalty oath that paved the way for the rise of McCarthyism, and the Korean War, especially the disastrous march to the Yalu River on China's border. All this split the Democratic Party, confused the electorate, emboldened the Republicans, and brought Truman's demise. Clay Blair summed up the effect of Truman's right wing shift in The Forgotten War, America In Korea: The war "fostered a national climate which strengthened the appeal of McCarthyism and similar repressive ideologies and unseated the Democratic Party, which had held the White House for 20 years."

Trapped in his own undeclared land war in Asia, Truman was so unpopular by 1952 that he declined to run for a second term. And the Democratic Party leadership had become so right wing that the Republican adversary, Dwight D. Eisenhower, outflanked the Democrats from the left. When Eisenhower promised to end the Korean War—"the time has come to bring our boys home"—Adlai Stevenson lost any chance for victory. (The same pattern repeated itself in 1968 when Democrats were trapped in Johnson's war in Vietnam).

(Continued in Part II)

[POA]

Part II

Johnson Won as a Dove, Lost as a Hawk

The rise and fall of Lyndon Johnson is full of lessons that centrist Democrats overlook. Centrists ignore the progressive character of Johnson's historic landslide of 1964, and they overlook the right-wing causes for Johnson's humiliation, the self-destruction of the Democratic Party in 1968.

It was a progressive not a centrist strategy that set off the landslide of 1964. Johnson did not "hug the center." He used a mass, grand coalition strategy similar to FDR. Three progressive themes—peace, commitment to ending poverty, full civil rights-dominated the 1964 campaign. "We can't just push a button," Johnson would say at his campaign stops. "and tell an independent country to go to hell. We cannot keep the peace by bluff and bluster and ultimatums." Johnson also challenged the conservative premise that mass poverty is the fault of the poor, a permanent part of American society.

In civil rights, Johnson took the most advanced position on racial issues of any Democratic Party nominee in post-war history. Johnson toured southern states, confronted the residual fears of his southern brethren, and appealed to the enlightened self-interests of black and white together. Under the impact of the civil rights movements, the Johnson team rejected the centrist strategy, the kind of campaign that seeks to avoid civil rights issues and panders to whites' fear of change.

As early as the 1960s the centrist approach already had a record of failure. Adlai Stevenson, the experienced governor of Illinois, cultivated a liberal image, but practiced a centrist strategy in his in campaigns. During the 1956 campaign against Eisenhower. a black woman asked Stevenson to take a clear stand on the historic Supreme Court ruling against segregated schools. Stevenson, who became a two-time loser, refused to support the use of federal troops to enforce the ruling. He even reached an agreement with Eisenhower to keep the issue of race and segregation—an issue on the mind of all Americans—out of the campaign. As a result of default on civil rights, Stevenson lost by a bigger margin in 1956 than in 1952.

By 1960 it was becoming clear that Democratic candidates could not win presidential elections, much less a real popular mandate, by running away from civil rights. In the Kennedy campaign of 1960, a mere phone call to Coretta King on behalf of Dr. King in jail may have made the difference between defeat and Kennedy's slim victory. Johnson wisely did not repeat the mistakes of Stevenson. Johnson even went beyond FDR, Truman, and beyond Kennedy on civil rights, passing the historic Civil Rights Bill of 1964, then attacked Goldwater for his opposition to the 14th amendment. No congressman who voted for the 1964 civil rights bill was defeated for reelection, and 11 congressmen who voted against the civil rights bill (out of 22 northern congressmen) were defeated for reelection.

The Johnson campaign discredits the prevailing "white-flight" theory, not only in contrast to Stevenson's defeats, but in contrast to the subsequent centrist campaigns of Mondale and Dukakis, former liberals who tried to play down civil rights. Since 1944 Johnson was the only Democratic candidate to win a majority of white voters.

In the post-Johnson period, it was Democratic Party default on civil rights, not identification with black progress, that made the Republican "southern strategy" successful. When Democrats keep faith with progressive traditions, when they stand on principle, the Republicans become the whiners and weaklings, like Goldwater in 1964.

Theodore White, award-winning conservative chronicler of post-war national campaigns, called the Johnson crusade of 1964 "the most successful campaign in all American history." The enlightened, progressive tone of the campaign, its connection with grassroots movements outside the official Democratic Party, garnered 61 percent of the popular vote, the largest percentage at that time in U.S. history.

To be sure, the Johnson campaign did not take place in a vacuum. Democratic leaders resisted change and only took progressive positions under pressure. Electoral campaigns that reflect the aspirations of democratic-minded voters will rarely succeed unless they are backed by an aroused, active movement. The peace movement and civil rights movement were decisive parts of the Johnson landslide. Reluctant at first, the Democratic Party leadership finally identified the party with movements for social reform, and they portrayed those movements, not as "special interests," (as centrists treat them today), but as just causes of concern to all Americans.

So long as the leadership of the Democratic Party upheld its progressive mandate, the credibility of the party remained high. Lyndon Johnson, once a segregationist himself, earned worldwide respect for the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, commended the freedom lighters who marched in Selma and sang "We Shall Overcome." In January 1966 Johnson and Congress got unprecedented high ratings in the polls for liberal legislation. A Harris poll rated public approval of the Great Society legislation: Medicare for the aged, 82 percent; federal aid to education, 90 percent, excise tax cuts, 92 percent; the voting rights act, 95 percent.

What Went Wrong?

The centrist Democrats have forgotten the somersault, the betrayal of Lyndon Johnson. It was not the liberal agenda that precipitated the long-term decline of the Democratic Party in the 1970s. It was only after Johnson's rightward shift, and the escalation of the illegal wars in Indochina, that mass defections from the party took place. In making fateful concessions to the generals, the Pentagon, the arms manufacturers—that "military industrial complex" of which Eisenhower warned—the Democrats "converted the greatest mandate, the greatest personal triumph of any election, that of 1964, to the greatest personal humiliation of any sitting president" [White]. The deployment of 500,000 troops to Vietnam, the carpet bombing of North Vietnam, the CIA atrocities (like Operation Phoenix that killed 20,000 South Vietnamese civilians), the growing contempt for world opinion and the rule of law, the drafting of black and brown high school graduates whose new hopes for social progress were transformed into search and destroy operations abroad, the gutting of domestic programs ($6 billion cut in 1966), the war-induced inflation that stretched into the late 1970s—all caused a period of decline and disillusionment from which Americans and Democrats have yet to recover.

Theodore White writes that "the confidence of the American people in their government, their institutions, their leadership, was shaken as never before since 1960 . . . The Vietnam decisions of 1965 were to initiate a sense of helplessness in American life which no candidate could cure." In its fatal right-wing shift, the party leadership turned its back "on all the great promises and domestic experiences of one of the most visionary administrations ever to hold helm in America."

In 1968 Hubert Humphrey, once proud of his liberal record, campaigned as Johnson's proxy. His centrist campaign, his broken spirit, his refusal to make a clean break from Johnson's war, his refusal to call for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, made Nixon's victory possible. The Republicans have a history of goading liberal Democrats into right-wing wars against Third World countries, then leaving Democrats with the results of their own folly. And once again the Republicans outsmarted the Democrats. Notwithstanding his record as a witch-hunter and war-hawk, Nixon became—by default of the Democrats—the "peace" candidate. He offered a secret plan for ending the war. The Democrats, so far gone in pro-interventionist policy, were outflanked again.

The Johnson betrayal made subsequent Democratic victory nearly impossible. Both Hubert Humphrey, who campaigned as Johnson's proxy, and McGovern, who was forced to campaign against his own party leadership in a time of disarray, were part of the aftermath of Johnson's folly.

In their right-wing shift in the mid-sixties, the Democrats turned from a party of peace to a party of war, a party of hope to a party of despair, a party of civil rights to a party of vacillation and Bakke backlash. Today's centrist Democrats have a lack of clear democratic principle, disregard for the opinions of mankind, contempt for constitutionalism and the international rule of law, immersion in the ideology of' imperialism, dependency on corporate finance and the PAC system of electoral bribery, loss of faith in human progress and empowerment. All these centrist maladies go back to the period of self-destruction when the Democratic Party leadership betrayed its mandate for peace, equality and social reform.

The centrist strategy today is merely a continuation of what took place in the mid-sixties when the Democratic Party made its fateful right turn.

[POA]

Part III

Carter Goes Down With The Shah

The Carter administration was no exception to the right-wing follies of one-term Democratic presidents. Betrayal of his own human rights policy brought Carter's own downfall. The American people first liked Jimmy Carter. They respected his stand in support of human rights, and they viewed him as a genuine humanitarian. The historic Camp David accords generated world-wide respect and brought widespread approval at the polls,

Then Carter made one of those right-wing mistakes that prove to be the undoing of the Democratic Party. There is an old saying: "Lie down with dogs, get up with fleas." On New Years Eve in Teheran in 1978. at a private party in the sumptuous home of the Shah of Iran, whose SAVAK was -notorious for terror and torture, Carter toasted the Shah and called Iran "an island of stability" in a troubled world. It was not long after that riots broke out, and the hated Shah was deposed. While South Africa offered asylum to the Shah, most countries, including Britain and France, closed their doors. President Carter first resisted the Shah's requests for safe haven in the United States. After all, the U.S. Embassy in Iran had warned the president of potential repercussions if the U.S. aided the Shah, whose hopes for a counter-revolution were public knowledge. In one prophetic moment Carter asked: "What do we do if our embassy personnel are taken hostage?"

But right-wing pressures on Democratic presidents are unceasing. David Rockefeller, whose banks held $8 billion in Iranian assets, a personal friend of the Shah; and Henry Kissinger, mastermind of the illegal secret bombing of Cambodia for the Nixon administration, urged Carter to bring the Shah to the U.S. American arms dealers, who concluded $15 billion in arms sales to the Shah between 1974 and 1978, also put pressure on the White House.

When Jimmy Carter succumbed to the pressure, he not only reversed his own position on human rights, he touched off a crisis that ended any chance for winning the campaign of 1980. Having goaded Carter into an open alliance with the deposed Shah, Kissinger and Rockefeller never took responsibility for the subsequent disaster. They let the Democrats take the blame.

Just as Eisenhower became the "peace" candidate against Truman's Korean War, just as Nixon capitalized on Johnson's war and Humphrey's timidity, so Ronald Reagan got credit for bringing home the hostages.

Defeatism in the 1980s

Antipathy to progressive politics still dominated the conservative, PAC-financed leadership of the Democratic Party throughout the 1980s. In 1982 for example, national party leaders, including Walter Mondale, opposed the progressive campaign of Harold Washington for mayor of Chicago. They even endorsed and worked for Washington's right-wing opponents—Jane Byrne and Richard Daley—before Washington (who spent $1 million compared to Byrne's $10 million and Daley's $4 million) achieved an historic victory. The Congressional Quarterly called Mondale's platform "economically the most conservative platform in the last fifty years." Mondale called for cuts in social spending, higher taxes (without specification of corporate and wealthy categories), and an increased military budget. In their 1980s campaigns both Mondale and Dukakis minimized the concerns of African-Americans and Hispanics, and both degraded the peace movement and women's movement to the level of "special interests." The Dukakis silence on the atrocities against Nicaragua, his media tank ride, (a pitiful attempt to out-macho Bush), all weakened the Democratic campaign for the presidency.

The Clinton years are paradoxical. As a centrist who won two terms in office, Clinton seems to be an exception to the pattern of centrist defeats. But Clinton's regressive policies in office actually weakened the capacity of the party to mobilize American voters against right-wing trends. Republicans took over Congress under Clinton, who alienated labor—the party base—when he signed NAFTA and adopted "free trade" globalization policies. Senator Kerry, for example, voted for NAFTA. And now he is forced to campaign against its horrendous results, the export of American jobs abroad. And Kerry is trying to address a massive health care crisis that flows directly from Clinton's bow to insurance companies and HMOs.

Will centrist Democrats repeat their past mistakes in the pending national election?

We cannot predict the future with certainty. "History," as Barbara Tuchman writes, "is only a lantern on the stern." But we can prepare for the showdown of 2004 in two ways. First, by connecting history's dots, perceiving the connection between the long, sorry record of Democratic right-wing follies and the recent decades of reaction and defeat. Second, by turning our burgeoning protest movement into an electoral force. Yes, protest movements (like the movements that retired Johnson and Nixon) affect elections. They change consciousness. They focus on principles and issues that both parties try to avoid.

Our strategy for defeating Bush is not a question of pessimism or optimism. It's a matter of where we place our hopes—in our young movement, or in a corporate-financed party.

Sure, we will vote for Kerry, and Nader is almost irrelevant. But we cannot limit ourselves to Democratic Party themes or tactics, or fold our peace movement into a Democratic Party tent. Through teach-ins, marches and mass demonstrations, truth-squads at Bush rallies, soap-box rallies on the streets of poor communities—through action—we can hold Bush accountable for his impeachable offenses—his lies, bribes, assassinations, and lawlessness.

Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovakian playwright and revolutionary, commented: "Society is a mysterious animal with many faces and hidden potentialities, and it's extremely short-sighted to believe that the face society happens to be presenting to you at a given moment is its only true face . . . None of us know all the potentialities that slumber in the spirit of the population . . . or all the ways in which the population can surprise us when there is the right interplay of events, both visible and invisible."

Under the impetus of the mass movement, even some centrist Democrats may recall their own history and try to recover their lost progressive heritage. While there is no greater imperative facing our nation than the defeat of George W. Bush, Michael Moore is right: "We cannot leave this election to the Democrats to screw it up."

Paul Rockwell is a columnist for In Motion Magazine.

[Moses]

A valid history, but I don't think his solution is correct.

A clue to its emptiness is the person he chooses to end his essay with:

Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovakian playwright and revolutionary, commented: "Society is a mysterious animal with many faces and hidden potentialities, and it's extremely short-sighted to believe that the face society happens to be presenting to you at a given moment is its only true face . . . None of us know all the potentialities that slumber in the spirit of the population . . . or all the ways in which the population can surprise us when there is the right interplay of events, both visible and invisible."


Vaclav Havel supported the war in Iraq.

And the whole "centrist" tag is bullnuts.

I don't know what the answer is, but street demonstrations only allow the orchestrators to segment us into political segments.

But politically, Kerry is Humphrey--

The Democratic Party rots.

[karpomrx]

When I was a boy our school had an assembly which focused upon the values of "Americanism". I remember being impressed by the main speaker's point that we were able to have one parent at home for the kid's well-being, and that if the day ever came that we warehoused our children so that both parents could work, we would be another collective society.
The destruction of progressive values is usually done by the artifice of national need- warfare is the most common need used by the state. The socialists of Europe were neutralised by WWI. The socialists of the USA were trivialised by the post WWI hysteria over "bolsheviks".
How does one tell people things they don't want to hear?
How do we inspire hope for the best in ourselves-all of us?
These are part of the failure of our social organizations, we cannot afford this.

[Moses]

It truly is frightening that we are in such dire straits and the subject isn't even broached in any mainstream public forum.

It took Greenspan to say "Capitalism isn't Working!" in Paul O'Neill's book-- and yet this "Emperor has no clothes" statement was picked up nowhere.

Instead, we are guided into a consensus that all we need is worker retraining!

Absurd!

Senator Hollings gave an impassioned speech about how absurd this is-- calling out Kerry, in particular--

And now look who our nominee is.

What a nightmare.

[POA]

Moses said:

It truly is frightening that we are in such dire straits and the subject isn't even broached in any mainstream public forum.

It took Greenspan to say "Capitalism isn't Working!" in Paul O'Neill's book-- and yet this "Emperor has no clothes" statement was picked up nowhere.

Instead, we are guided into a consensus that all we need is worker retraining!

Absurd!

Senator Hollings gave an impassioned speech about how absurd this is-- calling out Kerry, in particular--

And now look who our nominee is.

What a nightmare.

Could you find this speech for me? You've mentioned the issue of job retraining before, and I'm intensely curious as to what Hollings had to say on the issue.

POA

[Moses]

I'll try. It's incredibly difficult to find floor speeches. They are there, listed under the bill but you have to know the bill and keep going through page after page of the congressional record.

I can't recall the bill -- Kerry was supporting it -- oh yes!! To give fast track negotiation powers to Bush.

[nemo]

Not to seem snarky, but have either of you tried "Thomas"?

thomas.loc.gov/

It might help find what you are looking for; it has a phrase search capability.

[Moses]

Trouble is, the only exact phrase I recall is Hollings's sing-song ridicule of Kerry, the phrase being "free-trade, free trade, free trade".

[Moses]

Haven't found the part about Kerry yet, but this applies.

Hollings say, "the fix is in"-- He calls "Fair Trade" , "fixed trade".

---

TRADE ACT OF 2002--CONFERENCE REPORT -- (Senate - August 01, 2002)

---

 Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, you will see on page 44 that the Social Security moneys, to the tune of $157 billion, is spent. It shows it in his own document. We need to catch these fellows. That is why I say the budget is corrupt.

   Robert Kennedy, who used to sit at this desk, wrote a famous book, ``The Enemy Within.'' I could write a book called ``Your Best Friends and My Best Friends.'' The best friends are the Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, the National Manufacturers Association, and the National Federation of Independent Business. They are the enemy within for fixed trade . Yes, they want to export--export our jobs. That is what this is all about. Senator Byrd, over half of what we consume in this country is imported. Does the Senator realize that?

   We import 56 percent of our optical goods; 80 percent of our watches; and 42 percent of our semiconductors. I thought we were in the age of high tech, high tech, high tech--that motor of growth, high tech, high tech. But we import 42 percent of our semiconductors.

   By the way, out in Silicon Valley, they do not have health care, and I say to Senator Byrd, they do not have medical care. They are part-time workers. My friends at Microsoft had to sue to get health care. I would rather have a GE plant where they are making turbines and employee make $24 an hour, than to have high tech, high tech plants, where people make $12 or $14 an hour. Don't give me this high-tech stuff. (A clear reference to the DLC pals)

   This is all catching up with corporate America on the front pages. Corrupt executives are going to be indicted. The Justice Department has charged some executives already, but not Kenny Boy Lay, of Enron. You do not even hear about him.

   The Commerce Committee brought the Enron and WorldCom crowds in for hearings. We also heard from David Freeman, of the California Power Authority . I wanted to know how Kenny Boy Lay could not have heard about the fraudulent pricing structure Enron had out there. I saw his wife on TV, who said Mr. Lay did not know anything. Mr. Freeman said he knew everything going on out in California, I can tell you that.

   We have enough to bring charges. But that said, I am wondering and worrying about this because the fellow in charge of this, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, used to worked at a law firm that represented Enron. And if you think we cleaned up corporate America the other day with the new accounting bill, we did not, because it did not include expensing stock options. We also need companies to change auditors every 5 years. If they do, then every 5 years you will have the auditors auditing the auditors. When you know that another audit group is going to come in behind you, you do not start any tricky stuff. You are on trial. That is the quickest way to clean up the books.

   I wanted to offer an amendment for that, but the leadership on both sides had it tabled. We have not solved that problem, but I will be back.

   Back to the task at hand, we import 46 percent of our camera equipment; 93 percent of electrical capacitors; 55 percent of printing and related machinery; and already 36 percent of motor vehicles. That is a third of the vehicles Americans drive. Imported cars keep taking over the market here, they keep taking over the market. Also we import 62 percent of our motorcycles; over 50 percent of our office machines; 70 percent of our television sets; and 50 percent of our crude petroleum.

   I ask unanimous consent to print this list in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:



Import
Commodity
percentage
Optical Goods

   56.5
Ball and Roller Bearing

   28.4
Watches

   80.8
Household Appliances

   31.5
Air Conditioning Equip.

   23.0
Semiconductors

   51.2
Computers, Peripherals, Parts

   56.5
Cameras and Equipment

   46.8
Electrical Capacitors

   93.5
Metal Forming Machine Tools

   46.9
Mechanical Power Transmission Equip.

   36.2
Printing and Related Machinery

   55.2
Textile Machinery

   58.3
Electrical Transformers

   51.8
Motor Vehicles

   35.6
Motorcycles

   62.1
Office Machines

   50.7
Televisions

   69.2
Crude Petroleum

   49.8
Steel Mill Products

   21.3
Electric Motors

   29.8
Consumer Electronics

   95.5
TV and Radio Broadcasting

   86.7
Printed Circuits

   24.6


   Mr. BYRD. Madam President, will the Senator yield?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield.

   Mr. BYRD. But don't we need this trade promotion authority ? Don't we need this trade promotion authority to wipe out those deficits so we can start moving our goods, other than farm products and along with them, too, don't we need this trade promotion authority , I say to the Senator? ``Trade promotion authority ,'' that tells me it promotes trade . [heh heh]

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I just read a list of products, showing how the fix is on with respect to trade . What they do is fix us. In other words, House members are elected every two years, so they have to explain their votes every 2 years. In the Senate, we just have to explain our votes every 6 years. So we do not have to explain too much.

   On our side, the Finance Committee is either a bunch of oil people or farmers--and that is a fix. When you get that crowd in there, they will accept anything with regards to trade , which they did with this particular conference report.

   Here is how they have fixed it in the past. In November of 1993, under fast track, Rep. PETER KING helped President Clinton organize the GOP supporters of NAFTA. When Rep. KING went home and found the Army Corps of Engineers was reneging on a deal to dredge, President Clinton fixed the problem for him.


   Lynn Martin, President Bush's Labor secretary, said that ``If the president didn't make deals, they'd be saying he doesn't understand Washington.''


   Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which the Senator from West Virginia carries in his breast pocket, says the Congress--not the President, not the Supreme Court--but the Congress shall regulate foreign trade .

   Mr. BYRD. Right.

   Mr. HOLLINGS. But here is how it is regulated. The President comes over and he gets this so-called fast track, which is fixed trade .[/u] So he gets a peanut butter deal, Durham wheat deal, orange juice deal, sugar deal, cucumber deal, beef deal, winter vegetable deal, frozen food deal, wine deal, and Honda auto parts deal.

   I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
[From USA Today, November 18, 1993]

   Wheeling, Dealing, To Assure a Victory
(By Steve Komarow)

   President Clinton couldn't get Rep. Clay Shaw's vote with a highway overpass, water project or federal courthouse. Shaw's demand was more personal: extradition from Mexico of the man accused of raping a 4-year old girl.

   ``I am now confident that the Mexican authorities will do everything in their power to see him brought to justice,'' said Shaw, R-Fla., as he announced his vote for the North American Free Trade Agreement.

   The California child, now 5, is the niece of Shaw's secretary and ``just a beautiful little girl,'' he said. Until NAFTA, it appeared unlikely her suspected attacker would be tried.

   Mexico doesn't send its citizens to the United States for trial, despite the existence of an extradition treaty between the two countries.

   But not Mexican Attorney General Jorge Carpizo has personally assured Shaw that they'll pursue Serapio Zuniga Rios and, if he's captured, extradite him.

   Shaw's deal stood out among the flurry of bargains the White House struck to secure passage of NAFTA. But at least ``it had something to do with Mexico,'' unlike many, said colleague Jim Bacchus, D-Fla.

   More often, they fell in the traditional category of favors a president can bestow within limits of the budget.

   The White House offered everything from presidential jogging dates to road projects during its final push.

   Opponents screamed foul.

   ``It's obscene, this horse-trading of votes,'' said Rep. John Lewis, D-Ga., a ``no'' vote.

[Moses]

Holllings takes the floor re: conf. report Bush Fast Track trade auth:

 Mr. HOLLINGS. Madam President, I thank my colleague from North Dakota. If the Senate had been in session listening and heard the persuasive argument made by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota and we had a vote, we would vote his way immediately because he has presented the case.

   The only thing is, he has not presented the case in the stark reality that it really is. We are talking to a fixed jury. As an old trial lawyer for some 20 years, where I made enough to afford the luxury of serving here, I know how to talk to a fixed jury. Specifically, the contention in the trial of this case is that we have to give the President negotiating authority that cannot be amended; it is on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; and that the trading nations, some, let's say, 160, 170 trading countries, just will not enter into an agreement unless the President has fast track.

   He doesn't want to go through the negotiation period and then find that his particular trade agreement has been amended on the floor of the Congress.

   If you refer to the 2001 Trade Policy Agenda and 2000 Annual Report , which is the most recent, issued by the U.S. Trade Representative, turn to page 1 of the list of trade agreements. You will find, in essence, five trade agreements as a result of fast track, and thereafter some 200 agreements without fast track. The contention that you can't get an agreement unless you have fast track is totally absurd.

   We have had the Tokyo round, and the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement. Incidentally, this Senator voted for that because we have relatively the same standard of living. We have the labor protections. We have the environmental protections. When you have a level playing field, I am delighted to vote for trade , and so-called free trade . But now, we have fixed trade .

   That is what we are debating. This jury is fixed. We also had the United States-Israel trade agreement, which I also supported; NAFTA, which I opposed; and the Uruguay Round with WTO. Those are the five so-called trade agreements under fast track. But then turn the pages and continue turning, and there are some 200 trade agreements without fast track.

   When I first got here, we had SALT I, and it was very complex. We had reservations and amendments on the floor of the Congress. We had a vote on that. We didn't have fast track for SALT I and fast track for SALT II and fast track for the chemical weapons treaty. The contention of the White House is you can't get trade agreements, but the President needs to look at his own book.

   Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I am delighted to yield.

   Mr. BYRD. Is he telling me that trade agreements can be negotiated without this fast-track mechanism?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Yes, sir.

   Mr. BYRD. Is that what he is saying?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. I tell the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, they literally have almost a dozen and a half pages of all of these agreements, right here in the President's report , that were obtained without fast track.

   Mr. BYRD. I thought the President was saying to the country that he has to have this fast-track thing that we will vote on today in order to negotiate trade agreements. Is the Senator from South Carolina telling me he doesn't have to have that?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. No, sir, he doesn't. I can tell you now he wants the fast track for the fix.

   That is the point I want to make. I can tell you right now. Let's look at the result of the so-called trade agreements. Look at 1992, and you find that the Foreign Trade Barriers of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative is 267 pages long. Oh, we had WTO, we had GATT, we had NAFTA, and we did away with all the barriers. Why then is this year's Foreign Trade Barriers--458 pages long?

   Like the monkey making love to the skunk, I cannot stand any more of this. I can tell you that right now. For Heaven's sake, don't give me any more free trade agreements or fast tracks. This would be the end of the argument, if you didn't have a fixed jury. What is better proof? I am using the President's proof. No. 1, he doesn't need fast track and, with fast track, we are actually going out of business.

   Mr. BYRD. Will the Senator yield for a question?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. Yes.

   Mr. BYRD. What I have been hearing the administration say is that this is trade promotion authority. Does the

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Senator mean to tell me here in front of the eyes of the Nation, the ears of the people, that the President doesn't need fast-track in order to negotiate trade agreements for the United States? Is that what the Senator is saying?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. There is no question, Senator----

   Mr. BYRD. That is not what the President has been saying, is it?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. No. You bring out the point that this is bipartisan. President Clinton said he had to have fast track for NAFTA.

   Mr. BYRD. We didn't give it, did we?

   Mr. HOLLINGS. That is right. They said if we pass NAFTA we would get 200,000 jobs, but we lost 700,000 textile jobs. In the State of South Carolina, since NAFTA, we have lost more than 54,000 jobs.

   Now, this farm crowd, they get their $70 billion bill, and they come here blinking their eyes and talking about free trade , free trade . They get all the subsidies and protection--the Export-Import Bank, support payments, and everything else of that kind--and they run away with some $80 billion. The poor, hard-working people, such as your mine workers and my textile workers--

   Mr. BYRD. Yes.

   (Mrs. CARNAHAN assumed the Chair.)

   Mr. HOLLINGS. As the distinguished Senator from Texas always says, they are pulling the wagon, paying the taxes, keeping the country strong. We have removed 700,000 textile jobs alone. Akio Morita and I went to a seminar in Chicago almost 20 years ago, and they were lecturing about the Third World countries, the emerging nations trying to become nation states.

   Morita, then head of Sony, said: Wait a minute, in order to become a nation state, you have to develop a strong manufacturing capacity.

   Then later, he turned and said to this Senator: Senator, the world power that loses its manufacturing strength will cease to be a world power.

   I am worried about this country. I tell you, we have over a $412 billion deficit in fiscal year 2002 .

   Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that page 1 and page 60 of the Mid-Session review on the budget just issued be printed in the RECORD.

   There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

   Summary

   When this report was published last year, the nation was in the midst of a recession that, predictably, was already having detrimental effects on the government's finances. What no one could predict was that just 20 days later, a lethal attack on America would exacerbate the recession and trigger extraordinary military, homeland defense, and repair expenditures that would at least temporarily make an enormous difference in the fiscal outlook.

   By the February 2002 submission of the Budget for fiscal year 2003, the budgetary effects of the recession and the war on terror were well understood. It was also becoming apparent that the flood of revenue that produced record surpluses in the late 1990s was driven both by underlying economic growth, the traditionally decisive factor, and, in ways no yet fully grasped, by the extraordinary boom in the stock market. The markedly greater dependence of revenues on stock market developments was not yet understood by experts either inside or outside the government.

   The economic recovery appears to be underway, the one-time costs of recovery are being paid, and the expense of war-fighting abroad and new protective resources at home have been incorporated in budget plans. Taking all these changes into account, the federal government is now projected to spend $165 billion more than it receives in revenues in 2002 , up from the $106 billion projected nearly six months ago. Table 1 below comparing February and July estimates shows a return to the pre-recession pattern of surpluses in 2005, and growing surpluses thereafter. Future improvements, however, depend to a significant extent on two key factors: (1) restraint of the recent rapid growth in federal spending; and (2) a resumption of growth in tax payments produced by a stronger economy and a stronger stock market.

   MOVING FORWARD AMID THE BACKDROP OF WAR

   President Bush placed two purposes above all others in his 2003 Budget: Winning the war on terror and restoring the economy to health. On both fronts, initial progress has been encouraging. Military action in Afghanistan has depleted the ranks and greatly weakened the operational capabilities of the terrorists. On the economic front, the nation's gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an impressive 6.1 percent annual rate in the first quarter of 2002 , making the recession both shorter and shallower than most and the early recovery far stronger than assumed in February's budget.

   For the future, we can be certain only of the intentions of our adversaries and our own resolve to defeat them. We know neither the length of the conflict nor the budgetary expense of victory. Nor can we be certain the economy will not be weakened by further shocks. To preserve the flexibility to respond to future events while maintaining a fiscal framework that will return the budget to surplus, it is imperative that spending, .....

TABLE 1.--CHANGES FROM 2003 BUDGET

[Moses]

TRADE ACT OF 2002--CONFERENCE REPORT -- (Senate - August 01, 2002)
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   Clinton's signature was all over Capitol Hill.

   ``I know that peanut growers are concerned about imports of peanut butter and peanut paste as well as quality,'' the president intoned in a typical letter to lawmakers with goober-growers in their districts.

   Better to risk looking like a wheeler-dealer than to risk losing the critical NAFTA vote. And what's so bad about a little give-and-take?

   Said Lynn Martin, President Bush's Labor secretary, on Larry King Live: ``If the president didn't make deals, they'd be saying he doesn't understand Washington.''

   Quid pro quo: Who got what to win votes for the North American Free Trade Agreement, President Clinton has made side deals with members of Congress, promising benefits for their districts--mainly protecting the prices farmers and manufacturers get for their products. Some examples:

   Peanut Butter the Deal: U.S. peanut growers claim Canada, with 25% of the U.S. market, evades trade barriers by processing peanuts from China and Africa. Clinton will seek limits on peanut butter and paste shipments to the USA if Canada doesn't cut back within 60 days.

   Durum Wheat the Deal: U.S. producers of durum wheat, used in spaghetti and macaroni, complain Canadian growers get transportation subsidies. President Clinton promised talks with Canada and, if talks fail, said he'd seek limits on imports from Canada. Either way, the price would go up.

   Orange Juice the Deal: Clinton would impose pre-NAFTA tariffs on frozen orange juice concentrate if Mexican shipments rise, pushing prices below a five-year average for five straight days. Also, he'll limit tariff reductions the administration would accept in free-trade talks with other countries.

   Sugar the Deal: Mexico agreed to tighten controls on sugar and high fructose corn syrup exports to the USA. If the ceiling is exceeded, Clinton could impose tariffs. Also, Mexico pledged to prevent Mexican candymakers from using corn syrup, which would have freed Mexican sugar production for export.

   Cucumbers the Deal: Clinton would impose pre-NAFTA tariffs if Mexican shipments rise, pushing prices down. Also, he'll limit tariff reductions the administration would accept in talks with other countries.

   Beef the Deal: New rules will keep Australian and New Zealand beef from coming though Mexico by requiring shippers to show where the animals were raised.

   Winter Vegetable the Deal: Clinton pledged to diligently enforce NAFTA provisions that would allow reimposition of tariffs to protect against sudden import surges from Mexico of tomatoes, sweet corn and peppers.

   Frozen Food the Deal: Clinton agreed to push for ``country of origin'' labeling on products like frozen broccoli. Unions complains many plants in that category have moved to Mexico in recent years to take advantage of Mexican vegetable production and cheaper labor.

   Wine the Deal: Clinton would open negotiations to eliminate Mexico's tariffs more quickly than the 10-year phaseout NAFTA specifies. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor promised a new arrangement by May 1994.

   Textiles, Clothing the Deal: Clinton promised to work toward a 15-year, rather than 10-year, phaseout of American textile quotas in global free-trade talks. Also, the Customs Service will step up enforcement of trade quotas.

   Honda Auto Parts the Deal: The administration added a provision that will relieve Honda of paying $17 million in duties on auto parts shipped from Canada to its assembly plant in Ohio since 1989.


   Mr. HOLLINGS. The point is the fix is in. Members get all kinds of favors for their votes. I remember my good friend Jake Pickle got help with a cultural center down in Texas. I remember in northern California there were two golf games with President Clinton. Then there were two C-17s given down in Texas where they were making them, and on and on. Members who vote for trade get all the favors. They have already fixed this vote, and that is why you see the empty Chamber. They have made up their minds.

   But the country is in trouble with a $412 billion fiscal deficit, and we heard the figure by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota. Last month there was a $41.5 billion trade deficit, so we are right at a $500 billion current account deficit, with the outcome being a weakening of the dollar.

   We now have high unemployment. We have a Secretary of the Treasury that says everything is fine. That is nonsense. They want more tax cuts. They cut $1.7 trillion of the revenues and then wonder why at this time last year we were talking about a 10-year $5.6 trillion surplus and now we have a $412 billion deficit.

   They try to blame that on the war. I think we ought to look at this particular article about the Office of Management and Budget.